
Retrofitting Digital Substations






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Swissgrid is the one and only TSO in Switzerland





Historical grown



Various companies operate the grid, including Alpiq, BKW, CKW, Axpo, ewz and EGL.



2009 Swissgrid is responsible for the operation of the Swiss transmission grid.

2013 Swissgrid takes over the high voltage grid and thus the ownership responsibility.





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Challenges – Internal

Infrastructure

145 unique pieces of art, aka "switching stations"

Overaged Systems

Knowledge

Old Systems

New Engineers

Reasonable aged topic about Cyber Security

Political

Pressure for renewal is raising

Prioritization: IT vs. OT

No standardisation –previous owner Operational need for renewal is rising

Knowledge is retired
Knowledge needs to be built and maintained
Knowledge is there but not refined

Awareness and urge to do something

Awareness for Cyber Security risks



Challenges – Internal

OT – Services vs. IT Cyber Security

- Zone Concepts
- Segmentation of Subnets
- Segmentation of VLAN's
- Substation Data
- Remote Access
- Substation Jump Server
- Disturbance File Transfer

design the network and split it in certain zones

usage of different subnets for different services

different VLAN's for different services

extend your Datasets according your business model – Big Data

Providing access to the substation for maintenance issues – Station PC, IED's, Switches etc...

Access to a local Machine for Sniffing, adopt of Setting & Maintenance

Providing automatically transfer of the disturbances to the data-center



Challenges – External

Environment

Long Lifecycles

Different Lifecycles

Rapid technological development

Physics does not change

Demand for a smarter Grid

More control

More System protection

More interconnectivity

Big Data

Cyber Security functions for OT will keep to develop

What we do now will be with us for a long time

What fits together today needs to be able to adapt


What is built requires interfaces for future functions

What do we need to change

What is smarter grid


What is the right level of implementation





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Business-Model Swissgrid



Procurement by Tender according Swissgrid Standards



Business Model Step 1 (Rollout already started)

Cyber Specification

•	usage of intrusion detection s	ystems .	Avoid intruders,	supervise frames

usage of Substation Firewall
 Service controlled, Remote Access

usage of specified Notebook's for maintenance
 AD connected, supervised Access

Virtualize your Substation SCADA
 AD connected, supervised Access

"usage of IED Role & Password Concept"
 "the right man with the specific access"

Business Model Step 2

Act as System-Integrator

 IEC61850 E 	ditor (Helinks)) for Tender
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Pregualification C & P IED's

Pregualification of IT Components

usage of IED Templates

usage of Zenon (Copadata) as local SCADA

usage of standardized IO-Lists

usage of standardized Panel's & Terminals

Specification SSD and Datalist for Tender (SG)

POC for Control & Protection IED's – Frame Contracts (ext.)

POC for Switches, Firewalls (SG)

Templates are provided for each Feeder (SG)

Import of Project SCD File to represent the local SCADA (SG)

All IED IO's are predefined to terminals (ext.)

Common "Look & Feel" of each Feeder Type (ext.)



Business Model Step 3

Responsible for the supply chain – secondary System

 Providing Feeder Panels 	outsourced – according our Standards (ext.)
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•	FAT takes place at Swissgrid premises	Cyber Security Test-Environment, OT Operations, SNMP,
		Syslog, Metering (SG)


 IT Components provided by Swissgrid 	local SCADA PC (VM`s), Firewall and Switches (SG)
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•	IED Configuration & Communication Tem	nplates	around 95% matching	Config	& CID-Files ((SG))
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•	usage of Zenon as local SCADA	Import of Project SCD File to represent the local SCADA (SG)
	asage of Zerion as local out to t	


•	Predefined Tests during FAT	HW-Wiring Tests, C & P Tests, Redundancy OT Operation,
		Partner Interfaces, IT Security Alert Testing (SG)

Delivery, Mounting, Wiring & Commissioning outsourced mounting & wiring, insourced Commissioning (ext.)



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Architecture – digital substation





Architecture Concept – mandatory collaboration IT-OT

Security Specification

DMZ – HSZ Substation
 build demilitarized zone for your substations

VLAN's use VLAN's so segment the services

IDS-System (SCADA Analyzer)
 IDS System to detect cyber issues

SIEM
 Security Information & Event Management

Substation Notebook to protect unwanted access to the substation component

Password Protection connect all IT Components to the AD according rules and right

Operational Technologies / Services

Data Acquisition (Big Data) – Stakeholders

Operation Data
 Dispatchers, N-1 Calc, Operational Planning....

Cyber Information
 Detects of threats, attacks, unknown IT

Emergency Information
 break-in substation, fire alarm system....

Network Supervision
 SNMP, SYSLOG, Communication supervision

Metering Energy Data Management System

MOC (coming soon)

Maintenance Operation Center, evaluation of primary events

– e.g. counting pump starts for CB's

Strategy / Organisation Swissgrid

Organisation - Emergency Group (stand-by-duty)

 Operation Bridge 	IT-Group – Data Center Supervision
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• SOC Security Operation Center

PSS
 Physical Security Center – Emergency Center


NOC
 Network Operation Center

• OSC Operation Support Center

MOC
 Maintenance Operation Center

Provides 7/24 services, right information – on time – to the expert groups





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Current status / coming back to the challenges

Legacy substations - brownfield

- Swissgrid Grid Planning 2025 defined which substation has to be renewed, fully or partial (secondary system)
- Most Primary switchyards remains for approximately 10 years
- · Secondary equipment has to be replaced, end of life time
- Use of different vendor protection unit for lines is mandatory according the swissgrid standards
- How can we replace the secondary side with new technologies in a brownfield?
- How can we handle the tele protection with the remote end side?
- How can we provide Line Differential Protection over MPLS?
- What's about predictive maintenance?



Technical solutions - cost efficient

Realisation with IEC61850

- Interoperability of IEC61850 provides the customer vendor independent integration
- Brownfield Upgrading/Replacement divide the secondary side in two parts
 - Primary connection to the marshalling panel from the marshalling panel to the secondary panel (IED's)
 - IEC61850 Ring Architecture, PRP providing communication redundancy
- Tele protection will be realised by using the MPLS Network
- PTP time synchronisation will be used to ensure Line Differential protection over MPLS
- Replace both Line-End side Protection IED's for Differential Protection
- Extend the datasets from the substation to provide all needed information to the maintenance group



Boundaries – stakeholders group / Substation

Primary Process (Maintenance-Group)

Defined Standardized Interface to the switchyard – Marshalling Panel

Communication to the Data-Center (Network-Group)

Defined and Standardized Interface to the Grid Control Network – MPLS, IEC60870-5-104, Remote Access, Metering

Communication to Partners (DSO's) (SAS-Group)

- IEC60870-5-101 Interface for Cyber Security Reasons
- Hardwired Interface providing Trip`s, Blockings and Interlockings

Auxiliary Services (SAS-Group)

Standardized Interface to all auxiliary services



Supply Process – digital standardized Substation

Primary Process

Standardized Panels per Feeder Type

Wiring

Standardized Interfaces from the Secondary Panel to the Marshalling Panel

IED Configuration

Standardized Configuration per Feeder Type and Vendor

IED Communication IEC61850

• By using the IED Configuration – CID-Files should match around 95%

Auxiliary Services

Standardized Interface to all auxiliary services



Leveraging opportunities to a reasonable usage of IEC61850

System-Integration with IEC61850

 Standard IED Config – Vendor independent 	IO & Function matches our Standards
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Standard CID Config – Vendor independent Common Data Sets, RCB's

• IEC61850 Editor for Tender & Integration Helinks IEC61850 Engineering Tool – provides

Specification

HMI-SCADA – IEC61850 Interface
 Zenon generates your HMI automatically


IEC61850 Editor for Gateways Automatically generation of GW-Loadfiles out of Helinks

Comparable System Integration Compare your "as built" configuration with the tender one, by

comparing the SCD-Files


"on the fly" Parameter adoption
 IEC61850 dynamic Parameter-Value Change





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Questions?



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swissgrid

Backup Slides: Systemintegration Engineering Process

