WHEN TRUST MATTERS



## SMART Understanding GRID IEC 62443

Aligning IEC 62443 concepts, frameworks and controls with the cybersecurity risk of your power grid organisation

Webinar: 16:00-17:00 CET Wednesday 27th October 2021 Crowdcast Webinar Platform

#### Christian Nerland, Mirnes Alic DNV Cyber Security, Norway

27 October 2021



### Understanding IEC 62443 - Introduction

- 1. Increasing threat landscape
- 2. Cyber security for the Real world
- 3. Holistic Cyber Security
- 4. Starting early will pay-off
- 5. Recommended practices

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#### Increasing threat landscape – Impact is getting real..

HSE cyber-attack: Irish health service still recovering months after hack Predate Bit Microsoft



Cyber attack shuts down U.S. fuel pipeline 'jugular,' Biden briefed



#### Technology

SolarWinds says dealing with hack fallout cost at least \$18 million

By Raphael Satter

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Cybersecurity

#### Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password

By <u>William Turton</u> and <u>Kartikay Mehrotra</u> 4. juni 2021, 21:58 CEST

<ul> <li>Investigators sus</li> <li>Colonial CEO ho</li> </ul>	spect hackers got password from dark web leak ppes U.S. goes after criminal hackers abroad	LIVE ON BLOOMBERG     Watch Live TV >     Lictor to Live Radio >	
LISTEN TO ARTICLE  4:58  SHARE THIS ARTICLE  Share This article The share This article	From the Apple scoop machine Be the first to know what's next in tech from Mark Gurman's Power On newsletter. Enter your email Bloomberg may send me offers and promotions.	A new era of climate action Saudi Green Initiati and Middle East Gre Initiative Launch Ev	ents
in Post ⊠ Email	By submitting my information, I agree to the <u>Privacy Policy</u> and <u>Terms of Service</u>	LEARN MORE	23-25 October

The hack that took down the largest fuel pipeline in the U.S. and led to



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### The OT/ CPS maturity journey



Source. Gartner 01.25.21

#### Increasing OT Robustness

#### Holistic cyber security

Convergence

### **IT Security**

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability Information assets Frequent attacks average cost 4,2 MUSD Data leaks, privacy violations

ISO 27001



Availability, Integrity, (Confidentiality) Physical assets

Less frequent, but more severe attacks

Death, damage, environment, operations

**IEC 62443** 







### Cyber Security – starting early will pay off!

- Early involvement on Cyber Security is key
  - To identify and clarify consequences for concept and early FEED decisions
  - To make sure relevant requirements are included towards all stakeholders







### **Recommended practices**

	DNV·GL						
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE							
DNVGL-RP-G108	Edition September 2017						
Cyber security in the oil and gas industry based on IEC 62443							
DINV							
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE	E						
DNV-RP-0575	Edition August 2021						
Cyber security for power grid protection devices							

DNV RP G-108	Cyber security in the oil and gas industry based on IEC 62443 https://rules.dnv.com/docs/pdf/DNV/RP/2017-09/DNVGL-RP- G108.pdf
DNV RP 0576	Cyber security for power grid protection devices https://rules.dnv.com/docs/pdf/DNV/RP/2021-08/DNV-RP- 0575.pdf
Energy Academy	Two-day training course to improve the cyber security of your OT network by using IEC 62351 devices and implementations. https://www.dnv.nl/training/training-course-on-cyber-security- 189292







Know your cyber risks



Build a powerful force of defence



Win stakeholder support

### We will talk about ...

- Exposure in Power Grid
- Applying IEC 62443
- Case study: Ukranian Power Grid

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**Production Process** 

### Where to apply cyber security in utilities/grid operations



### Applying utility cyber security standards



#### Add Power Generators:

- Large DCS + SCADA connected to TSO
- Windmills (parks) DER
- Solar (fields)

#### Add Smart Metering + Comms Infra

Add ICCP – TSO-TSO-RSC + DSO-TSO







Asset owner System Integrator Product Manufacturer

Requirements/Controls SL 1 2 3 4

> Accident Low skill Moderate skill Advanced threat

CSMS RA Defence-in-depth Zones and Conduits Security Levels **Critical Assets Device Security** Visibility Response Human Factor Supply Chain

### IEC 62443 in project lifecycle



15 DNV © 27 OCTOBER 2021

Source: DNV-RP-0575 - Cyber security for power grid protection devices

# Ukraine power grid attack through eyes of IEC 62443



#### 3 steps:

- 1) Email phishing and C2
- 2) Recon IT / OT, enumeration, vulnerable devices, lateral movement, credential harvesting, becoming invisible, clean-up
- 3) Launch (attack duration 10 minutes)

#### Missing controls according to IEC 62443

FR	FR title	SR	SR title	SL1	SL2	SL3	SL4	Assessed SR	
1-IAC	Identification and authentication control	1.1	Human user identification and authentication						
1-IAC	Identification and authentication control	1.2	Authenticator feedback					FR1 = 0	
1-IAC	Identification and authentication control	1.3	Access via untrusted networks						
2-UC	Use control	2.1	Authorization enforcement			1			
2-UC	Use control	2.4	Mobile code						
2-UC	Use control	2.6	Remote session termination					FR2 = 0	
2-UC	Use control	2.8	Auditable events					1112 - 0	
2-UC	Use control	2.9	Audit storage capacity						
2-UC	Use control	2.11	Timestamps					1	
3-SI	System integrity	3.2	Malicious code protection						
3-51	System integrity	3.9	Protection of audit information			1		FR3 = 0	
4-DC	Data confidentiality	4.1	Information confidentiality					FR4 = 0	
S-RDF	Restricted data flow	5.1	Network segmentation						
5-RDF	Restricted data flow	5.2	Zone boundary protection			1			
5-RDF	Restricted data flow	5.3	Person-to-person communication restrictions					FR5 = 2	
5-RDF	Restricted data flow	5.4	Application partitioning						
6-TRE	Timely response to events	6.1	Audit log accessibility						
6-TRE	Timely response to events	6.2	Continuous monitoring					FR6 = 1	
7-RA	Resource availability	73	Control system backup						
7-RA	Resource availability	7.4	Control system recovery and reconstitution					FR7 = 0	
7-RA	Resource availability	7.5	Emergency power						
7-RA	Resource availability	7.7	Least functionality						

https://blog.isa.org/lessons-learned-forensic-analysis-ukrainianpower-grid-cyberattack-malware

### DNV and IEC 62443

- Work with all stakeholders (asset owners, integrators, manufacturers)
- Draws from experience in different sectors
- Cyber Security Management System
- Risk assessment
- System and component testing and certification (IEC 62443 and IEC 62351)
- Training (IEC 62351 DNV Energy Academy and IEC 62443)

Two-day training course to improve the cyber security of your OT network by using IEC 62351 devices and implementations. <u>https://www.dnv.nl/training/training-course-on-cyber-security-189292</u>

CyberGym Collaboration

#### DNV cyber security market segments



Oil and gas



Maritime



Electricity infrastructure & distribution



Renewables







Public sector



**Financial services**